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I.

Did

ISSUES PRESENTED

ON APPEAL

the District Court err in granting Respondents’

Motion

for

Judgment, and denying Appellant’s Motion?

Did

the District Court err in denying Appellant’s
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Motion

t0

Dismiss?

Summary

II.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature and Status 0f the Case.

House Speaker

Scott

Bedke and Senate President Pro Tempore Brent

Hill

(“Legislative leadership”) brought this declaratory judgment action asking the District Court t0

interpret the

the ﬁrst

meaning 0f LC.

§

67-1602(3) having t0 d0 with the use and allocation of space 0n

ﬂoor 0f the Capitol building.
State Treasurer Julie Ellsworth (the “Treasurer”), a resident of the Capitol’s ﬁrst

ﬂoor, has taken the position that § 67-1602(3) requires the Legislative Department t0 determine
the use 0f the space before Legislative leadership can proceed t0 allocate the space.

Legislative leadership has responded

the allocation 0f space,

and contending

that

by conﬂating the determination 0f use and

n0 separate determination 0f use

is

required of the

Legislative Department before Legislative leadership can proceed to allocate the space.

The Treasurer moved

t0 dismiss the action contending,

among

other things, that

Legislative leadership did not have standing to pursue this litigation until the Legislature

had

determined the use. The District Court denied that Motion.
Thereafter both parties

moved

Legislative leadership’s

Summary Judgment and the

for

Court granted

Motion and denied the Treasurer’s.

The Treasurer now appeals
Dismiss and her Motion for
B.

District

the District Court’s denial of both her

Motion

to

Summary Judgment.

Statement 0f Facts.

The controversy Which gave

rise to this case

occurred in 2007 in the midst 0f

matters surrounding reconstruction and renovation 0f the Idaho State Capitol building in 2007.

The ofﬁce 0f the Idaho
State Capitol Building since
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it

was

State Treasurer has

built.

It is

open every

been located 0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor 0f the
state business

day

to transact state

banking business and t0 invite the Visiting public to View the historic space, safe and
pp. 126—7.

It

The

the vault in the Treasurer

‘s

encompassed the Treasurer’

manganese

it

east

Wing 0f the

original building

s

The manganese

vault. Id.

Ada County

Courthouse).

west 0n State Street t0 the

before the outside wall

new

was completed.

who

of Idaho. R.,

p.

actually constructed around

original building

safe inside the vault

is

and came from the original

which

the oldest and

territorial

This heavy safe was placed on rollers t0

Id.

Capitol building, then slid into place inside the vault

Id.

The Appellant’s immediate predecessor
(“Crane”),

was

Ofﬁce and was the outside wall 0f the

safe west of the Mississippi river

capitol (the former

move

R.,

has been located in the same space since the ﬁrst original phase 0f the Capitol was

built in 1905. R., p. 91.

largest

vault.

held that ofﬁce in 2007. R.,

p. 82.

as Treasurer

was Ron G. Crane

C.L. “Butch” Otter

(“Ottel”)

was thmGovemor

26 1. Senator Robert L. Geddes (“Geddes”) was President Pro Tempore 0fthe

Idaho State Senate, and Representative Lawerence E. Denney (“Denny”) was Speaker of the
Idaho House 0f Representatives. R., pp. 254, 268.

When Governor Otter took ofﬁce
existing plan t0

in January, 2007,

add two story underground Wings

Capitol renovation project. R., p. 337.

he was opposed to the then

to the Capitol building as part

He was concerned

0f the proposed

about the cost and potential problems

with water leakage into wings that were two stories deep, especially due t0 underground hot

water in the area.

Id.

proposed budget.

Id.

Due to

his concerns,

The Governor did support
historic Capitol building, restoring

more

functional

by bringing
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its

he did not include funding for the project in his

the essential proj ect goals of saving and protecting the

original Character

the structure and

its

and splendor and making

systems up to date.

Id.

He

it

safe

and

also recognized the

need for more meeting and hearing rooms s0 the public could

and participate

attend, observe

To

the conduct of public business and have greater access to public ofﬁcials. Id.

Governor had extensive discussions and negotiations With
attempt t0

come

t0

that end, the

and members

legislative leaders

in

an agreement regarding his concerns and those of the Legislature. R.,

in

an

p.

338.

The Governor and

legislative leadership eventually

compromise agreement which, among other things, reduced the

reached a comprehensive

proj ect t0

basement extension Wings, transferred the ﬁrst ﬂoor from the Governor
the understanding that the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

would remain Where

approximately 120 million dollars for the project.

The agreement regarding
various documents from that time.
t0 Otter that the Treasurer’s

it

two

5,

ﬂoor

t0 the Legislature

With

was and appropriated

Id.

the Treasurer’s ofﬁce in particular

On March

single

is

memorialized in

2007 Geddes and Denney proposed

in a letter

banking function be removed from the Capitol Building and that

such ofﬁce space be given to the legislative

staff.

R., p. 109.

In response to that proposal Otter drafted a letter

conﬁrming

that

an agreement

“consistent With the Capitol Master Plan” had been reached to allow both the historic ofﬁce and

the banking function area to continue to be assigned to the Treasurer,

remain on the ﬁrst ﬂoor...“ 0fthe Capitol Building
reply to Otter in a letter dated

Agreement on behalf of the

March

9,

-

4

“Agreement”). R., pp. 110, 263—64. In

2007, Geddes and Denney acknowledged that

day,

A11 three

Geddes and Denny, have expressly conﬁrmed the existence

0f the Agreement in their afﬁdavits ﬁled in

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

.should he choose to

Legislature. R., pp. 111, 257, 264—65, 270—71.

principals t0 the Agreement, Otter,

On that same

(the

“..

March

this case.

9, in

R., pp. 257,

264—65, 270—71.

a legislative hearing on

House

Bill 218,

which

conﬁrmed

the sole authority of the Idaho Capitol

pursuant to I.C.

§

Commission to develop a Capitol Master Plan

67-1608, and approved the Plan developed by declaring

and necessary; and Which also contained the amendment
at issue in this case,

regarding

“...

Geddes informed the Senate

the space that

is

currently occupied

t0

LC.

State Affairs

by

it

to

be reasonable

67-1602(3) with the language

§

Committee 0f the “concessions”

the Treasurer

on the ﬁrst

ﬂoor...

“

of the

Capitol Building, including the “banking aspects” which by agreement with the Governor,
will

remain on the southeast corner of the ﬁrst ﬂoor...

“

until the Treasurer, or a “future

Treasurer chooses not t0 occupy that space.” R., pp. 112, 257—58, 86—88. Thereafter, on
22, 2007, the Legislature passed

this legislative history,

law without

Bill

218 amending LC.

its

§

March

67-1602(3), consistent With

approved funding for the Plan and Governor Otter allowed

his signature. R., pp. 83—84, 86—88,

At
t0 its

House

“

it

to

become

265—66.

meeting 0f March 28, 2007, the Idaho State Capitol Commission pursuant

“powers and duties” under

I.C. §

67-1608(2) to “review” and “approve”

all

proposals and

projects for restoration 0f the Capitol, in conformance with the “capitol building master plan,”

conﬁrmed and approved
the ﬁrst

the continued occupancy

ﬂoor of the Capitol Building,

by

the Treasurer 0f the southeast corner of

R., pp.1 13—120, (speciﬁcally p. 116),

Commission accepted the Master Plan ofMarch 28, 2007 which conﬁrmed

Commissionin schematic form.
The
Capitol

R., pp.

the decision ofthe

121—135. 86—88.

Legislature had planned for the dislocation being created

by passing Senate

Treasurer t0 temporarily

Bill

move

was complete and temporarily

1062 on March

-

5

2,

2007, which amended

I.C. §

by reconstruction 0f the
67—1204, t0 allow the

out 0f its historic Capitol building ofﬁces until the Capitol renovation

relieving the Treasurer 0f the duty to deposit State

vault and safe in the Capitol building and

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

and the

no other place.”

R., p. 248; see also,

monies “in the

2007 Idaho Session

Laws, Chapter 41,

The

§ 2.

Statute required that

reconstruction the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

upon completion 0f the renovation and

move back into

its

renovated space in the Capitol Building,

consistent With the Capitol Master Plan and consistent With the

Governor and

legislative leadership.

Some

eleven

advised then State Treasurer,

0n 0r before December
dated February

8,

1,

(1 1)

It

years

Id.,

Agreement reached between the

has remained there since that time.

a letter dated January 3

later, in

Ron Crane

that

“The House intends

t0

1,

2018, Speaker Bedke

occupy the [Treasurer’s] space

2018.” R., pp. 89—90. Treasurer Crane replied t0 Speaker Bedke by

2018, and proposed that the Legislature

move

its

Legislative Services

letter

Ofﬁce

Audits Division, from the Capitol Building t0 create the space Speaker Bedke was seeking. R., pp.

85,

91—92
Treasurer Ellsworth,

Who

succeeded Treasurer Crane in that ofﬁce 0n January

4,

2019, has likewise declined t0 remove the Treasurer’s ofﬁces and functions from the Capitol

Which

Building. R., pp. 106—7.

action has given rise t0 the case before the Court.

III.

ARGUMENT

Standards for Review.

A.

On Appeal from Summary Judgment.

1.

This Court exercises de nova review 0f a grant of summary judgment and the
standard 0f review

is

the

same

as the standard

summary judgment.

Security Investor

1036, 1041—2 (2019);

AED,

(2013).

The

Inc.

fact that the parties

v.

used by the

trial

Fund LLC v. Crumb,

KDC Invest., LLC,

165 Idaho 280, 285—6, 443 P.3d

155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d 176, 180

have ﬁled cross—motions for summary judgment does not

change the applicable standard 0f review. Security, 165 Idaho
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court in ruling on the motion for

at

285—6, 443 P.3d

at

1041—2.

Summary judgment

is

proper only

admissions 0n ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits,

any material

fact

and

The

CiV. P. 56(0).

fact that

establish that there is

1042.

that the

moving party

both parties

is

move

if any,

for

times With the party moving for

“the pleadings, depositions, and

show

entitled to

n0 genuine issue of material

The burden of establishing

when

that there is

judgment

n0 genuine issue

as a matter 0f law.” Idaho R.

summary judgment does not
fact.

as t0

in

and 0f itself

Security, 165 Idaho at 286,

443 P.3d

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at

at

all

summary judgment. Wright v. Ada County, 160 Idaho 491,

495, 376 P.3d 58, 62 (2016). The Court must construe the record in favor of the nonmoving

party,

drawing

all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.

Id.

If the

Court ﬁnds that

reasonable minds could differ 0n conclusions drawn from the evidence presented, the motion

must be denied.

Id.

When n0 jury has been demanded and the trial
the trial court

is

entitled to arrive at the

evidence properly before

it

most probable inferences based upon the undisputed

and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility 0f

Security, 165 Idaho at 286,

conﬂicting inferences.

443 P.3d

the trial court will be upheld if reasonably supported

demanded

in this case. R., pp. 8—14,

2.

by

at

it

reviews a motion t0 dismiss

Employers Res. Mgmt. C0.
v.

State,

162 Idaho
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No jury has been

213—224.

On Appeal from a Decision 0n a Motion to

summary judgment When

(quoting, Joki

1042. Such inferences drawn by

the record. Id.

This Court applies the same standard 0f review

12(b)(6).

court Will act as the ﬁnder 0f fact,

v.

5, 8,

it

Dismiss.
applies t0 a motion for

made pursuant t0 Idaho

R. CiV. P.

Rank, 162 Idaho 774, 777, 405 P.3d 33, 36 (2017)

394 P.3d 48, 51 (2017)).

Under Rule

12(b)(6), a court

Views

all facts

and inferences from the record

in

favor of the non-moving party, then determines Whether a claim for relief has been stated. Joki,

162 Idaho

at 8,

394 P.3d

whether the party

at 5 1.

The

issue

is

not Whether the plaintiff Will ultimately prevail, but

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Id.

is

Here, the District Court analyzed the Motion t0 Dismiss Which asserted
justiciability issues as a 12(b)(6) motion,

and

it

did not consider matters outside of the

pleadings. R., pp. 150—5 1. In 2017, this Court held that

it

was

error t0 consider a

motion

to

dismiss based 0n justiciability issues under Rule 12(b)(6) because such issues relate t0 a court’s
jurisdiction,

11, 18,

is

and should be considered under Rule 12(b)(1)

394 P.3d 54, 61 (2017). However, When a

instead.

facial challenge

Tucker

v.

State,

162 Idaho

based only 0n the pleadings

made, the 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) standards 0f review are the same. Employers, 162 Idaho

at

777, 405 P.3d at 36.

B.

The

District

Court erred

in granting Respondents’

Motion for Summary

Judgment and denving Appellant’s Motion.
1.

The circumstances, agreements and

history surrounding the Capital

Renovation demonstrate that the Treasurer’s ofﬁce was to remain in in

its

place in the

§

67-1602 (the

Capitol building.

The
“Statute”),

central issue in this appeal is the

meaning and

effect

0f I.C.

Which provides:

IDAHO STATE CAPITOL — ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF SPACE.

The space

within the interior of the capitol building shall be allocated and controlled as follows:
(1) Public space.

The

interior Within the rotunda, the hallways

0n the ﬁrst and second

ﬂoors, the restrooms located adjacent thereto, the elevators, the stairways between the

and fourth ﬂoors (excepting the interior stairways between the third
and fourth ﬂoors Within the legislative Chambers), shall be space Within the capitol
building open to the public (“public space”). Subj ect to this chapter, the director 0f the
ﬁrst, second, third
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department of administration shall maintain

(2)

all

public space.

Executive department. The governor shall determine the use and allocate the space

within the second ﬂoor. The director of the department of administration shall maintain

such space.
(3) Legislative department.

The

legislative

department shall determine the use 0f the

space on the ﬁrst, third and fourth ﬂoors as well as the basement, Which basement shall
include the underground atrium wings. A11 space Within the ﬁrst, third and fourth ﬂoors

and the basement

shall be allocated by
The presiding ofﬁcers

the presiding ofﬁcers of the senate and house 0f

maintain such space and provide equipment
and furniture thereto, provided however, that the presiding ofﬁcers may contract with the
director of the department 0f administration t0 maintain such space and provide
equipment and furniture thereto (emphasis added).

representatives.

I.C. §

67-1602

The
form

shall

in

2007

Statute

was

ﬁrst enacted in 1998

as part 0f the Legislature’s

ongoing

and subsequently amended

to

its

current

effort t0 facilitate the reconstruction

and

renovation of the Capitol building (the “Renovation”).

When originally enacted in
entirely

new

chapter, Chapter 306,

1998, the Statute

was only one small

Which consisted 0f twelve separate

statutes,

part of an

and Which was

passed t0 replace then existing law concerning the management of the Capitol and surrounding
grounds, former I.C. § 67-5707, Which was repealed. 1998 Idaho Session Laws, Ch. 306, §

The Statement 0f Findings and Purpose

for Chapter

2.

306 declared the Capitol

building t0 be “one 0f the most Vital and preeminent public buildings in Idaho, wherein the

legislative

department and a majority of the elected executive department ofﬁcers maintain their

ofﬁces and perform their constitutionally prescribed duties;” and that
preservation,

and concern.

its

historical character

I.C. §

and architectural uniqueness,

to

its

maintenance and

be of Vital public

interest

67-1601(1).

These statements of ﬁndings and purpose establish beyond doubt
Legislature and the Governor thought
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it

that the

imperative t0 preserve and protect the historical

character and integrity 0f the building. Certainly they had the Treasurer’s ofﬁce in mind, the
vault and safe 0f Which

had been

in place since 1905, well before the building

was completed

several years later.

When LC.
legislation, the ﬁrst

67-1602 was originally passed in 1998 as part of that comprehensive

ﬂoor 0f the Capitol was

“allocate the space.”

the Statute did

§

still

the Governor’s t0 “determine the use” and

1998 Idaho Session Laws, Ch. 306,

n0 more than

t0 transfer the ﬁrst

§ 2. Indeed, the

ﬂoor from Subsection 2

2007 amendment

to Subsection 3,

to

which

gave affect t0 the “comprehensive agreement” formed between the Governor and the
Legislature as outlined in the facts above. 2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 157, §

To

facilitate the

2007 Renovation other

including I.C. § 67-1204, which as

67-1204.

amended

statutes

3.

were also passed 0r amended,

in 2007, provided:

MONEY TO BE KEPT IN VAULT — PENALTY.

(1) A11 state

moneys

in

the custody of the state treasurer not otherwise deposited 0r invested as is 0r may be
provided by law, shall be kept in the vault and safe as provided for that purpose in
the capitol building and in no other place.

During the capitol building renovation, beginning in ﬁscal vear 2007, 0r during
same moneys as set forth above, shall be kept
in a vault Within the ofﬁce 0f the state treasurer’s temporary location.
Upon
completion 0f this renovation, the provisions of subsection ( 1) shall applv.
(2)

relocation due t0 an emergency, these

(3)

A

Violation of this section shall subject the state treasurer,

thereof, to

pay

a

ﬁne 0f not

less than

ﬁve thousand

upon conviction
more than

dollars ($5,000) nor

ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or t0 imprisonment in the state prison for a period of

not less than one (1) nor more than ten (10) years, 0r t0 both such fine and
imprisonment (emphasis added).
R., p. 248;

2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 41,

§ 2.

Section 67-1204 demonstrates that at the time I.C. § 67-1602
Legislature intended that the ofﬁce 0f the Treasurer

Renovation was complete.
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would be returned

was amended,

the

t0 the Capitol after the

Indeed, t0 the extent the Legislature has ever determined that the use of the ﬁrst

ﬂoor

is

t0 include occupation

by the Treasurer,

it

did so

When

it

amended

I.C. §

67-1204

in

2007.

The

2.

District Court’s decision 011

On summary judgment in this

summary judgment.

case, the parties

made

various arguments

regarding Whether the Statute was ambiguous or unambiguous, and offered competing
interpretations

and constructions of the Statute

in either event.

The

District

Court ultimately

determined that the Statute was unambiguous, and held that the Legislature expressly delegated
“all

of its power” to determine the use of space under

its

control t0

its

presiding ofﬁcers,

without any need for further action by the Legislature:

Having considered the
language 0f the

unambiguous.
t0 set forth
is

parties’

arguments and having independently reviewed the plain

statute, the Court

ﬁnds

that the plain text

0f I.C.

§

67-1602(3)

is

A plain meaning 0f the entire statute establishes that the statute is meant

Who

controls and allocates space in the Capitol. Certain space in the Capitol

reserved as public space, the Governor shall control the allocation of use for the

second ﬂoor and the Legislature shall control the

and fourth ﬂoors as well as
the basement (including the atrium wings). The Legislature expressly delegated all of its
power to allocate who actually is assigned the space under its control to its presiding
ofﬁcers. The plain text reading of the statute does not require additional action by the
Legislative Department regarding how the space under its control should be used.
ﬁrst, third

R., p. 457.

The
ultimately

deemed

Even

District

to

Court also held in the alternative that even

if the Statute

was

be ambiguous, the result would be the same:

if the statutory text

were deemed ambiguous by a reviewing appellate

court, this

Court alternatively ﬁnds that an analysis 0f textual evidence, the reasonableness 0f the

competing constructions, relevant legislative history, and public policy behind the
favors ﬁnding the legislative intent supports the Plaintiffs’ construction over the
Defendant’s construction.

R., pp.

457—8.
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statute

Appellant respectfully submits that the Court erred in both determinations,
regardless of Whether the Statute

is

deemed unambiguous

0r ambiguous.

Rules 0f statutory interpretation that apply When a statute

3.

The
nova. State

v.

interpretation

of a

statute is a question

is

unambiguous.

0f law the Court reviews de

Smalley, 164 Idaho 780, 783, 435 P.3d 1100, 1103 (2019).

Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute and the

words employed should be given
Evans, 166 Idaho 815,

361—62, 313 P.3d
t0 all its

1,

their plain, usual

and ordinary meanings. See,

_, 464 P.3d 301, 306 (2020) (quoting, State

17—18 (2013)). The

words and provisions, so

that

statute

v.

Nelson

e.g.,

v.

Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,

should be considered as a Whole, giving effect

none Will be void, superﬂuous, 0r redundant.

Id.

Parts 0f

a statute should not be read in isolation, but instead interpreted in the context 0f the entire

statute. Id.

When the

statutory language

is

unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the

Legislature must be given effect, and a Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.

Id.

On the

other hand, if the statute

is

ambiguous, the Court must engage in statutory

construction t0 ascertain legislative intent and give effect t0 that intent. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l

Med.

Ctr.

v.

Gooding

The

4.

Czy.,

Statute

159 Idaho 84, 87, 356 P.3d 377, 380 (2015).

unambiguously requires the Legislative Department “determine the

use” of the ﬁrst, third and fourth ﬂoors and the basement 0f the Capitol.

In

plain and distinct

interpreting

incorrect

them

its

summary judgment

decision, the District Court incorrectly conﬂated the

meaning of the terms “determine the use” and

same

as the

View early on

single act. R., pp. 455—6.

in the case, long before the
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The

“allocate,” in essence

District

Court adopted

this

summary judgment motions were

ﬁled,

when

it

decided the Treasurer’s Motion t0 Dismiss, Which focused on threshold issues regarding

the political question doctrine, standing and the like, not statutory interpretation:

In the context 0f I.C. § 67-1602(3), a vote bV the full Legislature determining the use 0f
its control would either designate 0r apportion such space for a speciﬁc

the space under

purpose, which would be an allocation. If the Legislature

is

required to vote to allocate

the space listed in I.C. § 67-1602(3), then the sentence stating that such space “shall be
allocated by the presiding ofﬁcers 0f the senate and house 0f representatives” would be

superﬂuous (emphasis added).

R., p. 153.

Yet reading the Statute as a whole, as the Court must,
separate and distinct acts. This fact

it is

apparent that they are

particularly obvious in the context 0f Subsection 2,

is

gives the Governor the right t0 both “determine the use”

w

“allocate the space”

Which

0n the second

ﬂoor. I.C. § 67-1602(2). Interpreting the terms as the same act renders one 0r the other of these

express terms redundant and/or superﬂuous, in Violation 0f the rules of statutory interpretation

discussed above. See Nelson, 166 Idaho at

_, 464 P.3d

at 306.

Two

separate acts are

expressly stated, are plainly required and accomplish two different things.

On summary judgment,

the District Court never addressed the plain, usual, and

ordinary meanings of the pertinent words employed in the Statute contrary to the rules of
statutory interpretation.

The

plain and ordinary

“allocate” are distinct and different

the

word “determine”

“allocate”

is

deﬁned

to

mean

“to

meaning 0f the words “determine” and

from one another. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary deﬁnes

ﬁx

conclusively or authoritatively.” In contrast, the

word

as “to apportion for a speciﬁc purpose or t0 particular persons 0r things.”

Thus, under Subsection 2 of the Statute, the Governor

is

empowered

to,

and

could “determine the use” 0f the second ﬂoor will be t0 house government ofﬁces generally,

w

then,

he or she

is

also
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to “allocate” 0r apportion speciﬁc portions

of the “space”

so “determined” to

some combination 0f executive ofﬁces,

Or one could

ofﬁces, for example.

facetiously suppose the

legislative

ofﬁces and/or judicial

Governor might also theoretically

“determine the use” of the second ﬂoor t0 be a public entertainment complex, and then
“allocate” 0r apportion speciﬁc portions 0f the “space” for a bowling alley, a restaurant, a bar

and game rooms.

The point
conceptually and in

fact,

is

that “determining the use”

and “allocating the space” are different

not unlike a decision to determine that the use of a particular piece of

land Will be t0 develop a subdivision, then allocating particular parts 0f the land t0 different lots

within the subdivision.

Subsection 3 0f the Statute regarding other areas 0f the Capitol
except the power t0 “determine the use”
Legislature as a whole, and the

determined,

Who

is

n0

different,

vested in the “legislative department,” meaning the

to “allocate” 0r apportion the “space,”

once the “use”

is

vested in the presiding ofﬁcers 0f the House and Senate. Unlike the Governor,

acts alone,

District

power

is

is

it is

axiomatic that the Legislature acts as a body 0f the Whole. Indeed, even the

Court acknowledged

later in its decision that the “Legislature

speaks and acts through

legislation.” R., p. 471.

Finally,

it is

signiﬁcant that the words “determine” and “allocate” are verbs used

in the future tense, indicating that the

Statute

becomes law. Had

demonstrates that

it

two actions speciﬁed

Will take place in the future, after the

the Legislature intended to declare afaz't accompli, the Statute itself

easily could

have done

so.

Subsection

1

plainly declares without

equivocation that speciﬁed portions 0f the building are “public space,” open t0 the public. I.C.
§ 67-1602(1).

In similar fashion,

Capitol t0 be used

by

had the Legislature intended the use of other parts of the

the executive branch, the legislative branch,
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etc., it

could have easily said

SO.

The
“control” t0

District

mean the same

Court also incorrectly interpreted the terms “determine the use” and

on the ﬁrst sentence and perhaps the

thing, relying

1602. R., pp. 456—7. In fact, later in

its

title

§ 67-

0f I.C.

decision While discussing legislative intent, the District

Court expressly stated the phrase “determine the use”

is

merely a synonym for “control.”

R., p.

459.

Yet again, The

District

meanings 0f these words, contrary

Court never addressed the plain, usual, and ordinary

t0 the rules

of statutory interpretation. The plain and

ordinary meaning 0f the words “determine” and “control” are also distinct and different from

each other. The Merriam—Webster Dictionary deﬁnes the word “determine,”
verb, to

mean

verb,

deﬁned

is

“t0

ﬁx

conclusively 0r authoritatively.” In contrast, the

thing,

and again, the

rules 0f statutory interpretation regarding

District

unambiguous

as a

“control,” used as a

as “t0 exercise restraining 0r directing inﬂuence over.” Thus,

words d0 not mean the same

464 P.3d

word

When used

it is

clear that the

Court failed t0 properly employ the

statutes.

See Nelson, 166 Idaho

at

_,

306.

at

Finally, the District Court erred in concluding that for additional Legislative

action t0 be required, Subsection 3 0f the statute

would have

before the term “determine the use.” R., pp. 456—7. There
that is

what

no need

words “to vote”

t0 include such words,

legislatures do, they vote.

In conclusion, the Statue

plain, usual,

is

unambiguous. Giving the words employed

and ordinary meanings, and giving

none will be void, superﬂuous, or redundant
conclusion

is

to include the

is

in the context

that the “legislative department”
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effect t0 all

must

its

words and provisions, so

0f the entire

act as only

their

it

statute, the

that

inescapable

can t0 “determine the use” of

areas 0f the Capitol under

5.

its

control.

In the alternative, if the Statute

is

deemed ambiguous,

rules

0f statutory

construction and other applicable aids t0 construction apply to compel the conclusion that the

must “determine the use” 0f the

Legislative Department

ﬁrst, third

and fourth ﬂoors and the

basement of the Capitol.

The

District

deemed ambiguous by

Court alternatively

— and

incorrectly

— held

that if the Statute is

a reviewing appellate court, an analysis 0f textual evidence, the

reasonableness of the competing constructions, relevant legislative history, and public policy

behind the

statute favors

ﬁnding the

legislative intent supports the Plaintiffs’ construction over

the Defendant’s construction. R., p. 457—8.

However, the
statutory construction

which

District

Court failed t0 consider and apply relevant rules 0f

are applicable here.

A statute is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ 0r be uncertain as to
its

meaning. State

v.

Lantis, 165 Idaho 427, 429,

447 P.3d 875, 877 (2019).

When a

statute is

ambiguous, Courts must look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the
reasonableness 0f proposed interpretations.

Id.

One such rule of construction
that the Legislature

statute

knew of all

legal precedent

was passed. Nelson, 166 Idaho

Sandpoint Indep. Highway

Another
are in pari materia

is

Dist.,

at

-

that courts

and other

_, 464 P.3d

that statutes relating t0 the

16

must construe a

statute

by assuming

statutes in existence at the time the

at

307, (quoting, City ofSandpoint

v.

126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994)).

— must be construed

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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same

subj ect matter

together. Id., (quoting, In re

—

0r those that

Adoption ofDoe, 156

Idaho 345, 350, 326 P.3d 347, 352 (2014); see also, Lantis, 165 Idaho
(quoting, City

ofldaho Falls

H-K Contractors,

v.

at

429, 447 P.3d at 877

Ina, 163 Idaho 579, 583, 416 P.3d 951, 955

(2018)).

In

discussion, the District Court stated that there

its

establishing formal adoption

the Legislature as a

by

the ﬁrst ﬂoor. R., p. 463. That

is

was nothing

in the record

whole determining the Treasurer’s use 0f

simply incorrect. Several days before the Statute

passed, the Legislature had also passed LC. § 67-1204, Which expressly required
things that

vault

moneys held by

the Treasurer and not otherwise invested

0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor 0f the Capitol

after the Capitol

been the case from the time the Capitol was

built.

at issue

among

must be returned

was

other

t0 the

Renovation project was completed, as had

2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 41,

§ 2.

Moreover, contrary t0 the statement by the District Court that there was nothing
in the record

0n the

issue, a

copy 0f the 2007 version of § 67-1204 was Exhibit

Afﬁdavit of Julie Ellsworth. R.,
There

is

p.

231, 248; Aug., p.

G to the

3.

67-1204 was known by the Legislature when

n0 question

that §

no question

that the Statute at issue is in in pari materia With § 67-

the Statute at issue, and

it

passed

1204, as both are related to use of space in the Capitol after the Renovation proj ect.

Accordingly, the two statutes must be construed together as required by the statutory rules 0f
construction discussed above.

When one

does

so, the inescapable

conclusion

is

Legislature must act to determine the use of at least the ﬁrst ﬂoor of the Capitol,

that the

where the

Treasurer’s ofﬁce and vault are located.

6.

The

aids to construction

that Respondents’ interpretation
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was preferred

which the

District

Court relied on t0 conclude

are incomplete, incorrect

and unpersuasive.

In

its

analysis, the District Court ﬁrst

found that “textual evidence” in the form

of the respective statements 0f purpose for the 1998 and 2007 versions of the Statute supported
its

preferred reading. R., pp. 458—59.

The

District

both statements of purpose, but the word “use”

The

R., p. 458.

is

Court noted the word “control”

is

used in

only included the 1998 statement of purpose.

concluded that because the statement of purpose in 2007

District Court

contained no reference t0 the term “use,” and while the 1998 statement of purpose did include
the term, there

was n0 evidence

On this basis,

speciﬁcally. Id.

that the reference to “use” in

1998 related t0

I.C.

§67-1602

the District Court found the legislative intent 0f the phrase

“determine the use” was merely a synonym for “control” as used in the two statements 0f

purpose for

I.C.

sense” because

§67-1602. R.,

much

it is

p.

459.

easier for

The

District

two people

Court also noted

its

View made

(the presiding ofﬁcers) t0 decide

“practical

how t0

allocate

ofﬁce space rather than having “two legislative bodies approve every ofﬁce change 0r move.”
Id.

The

District Court’s analysis

failed t0 take into account the fact that the

in 1998, not during the

amendment

was n0 reason

amendment. The

to

the

simply wrong. For example,

in 2007,

I.

more weight

3.

word “use”

2007 Idaho Laws Ch. 157,
in the statement

§ 3.

Consequently,

0f purpose related t0 the 2007

C. §67-1601, while the statement of purpose in 2007

to the

it

Which only involved moving the “ﬁrst ﬂoor”

District Court also apparently did not notice that the statement

1998 was encoded as
that lends

employ

this point is

term “determine the use” was placed into the Statute

reference from Subsection 2 t0 Subsection

there

on

was

of purpose in
not, a factor

1998 version.

Moreover, employing two statements of purpose nine years apart to declare two
statutory terms are

synonymous with each other
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is

a stretch in any event, particularly

When

the

meaning of the terms
employed

as a noun, as the “act 0r practice 0f employing something,” While the

used as a noun,

is

deﬁned

as

“power or authority

Finally, stating that

makes

it

conﬂating terms like “determine the use,

,9 ‘6

more of those terms
meanings

The

entirely

to guide or

word

manage.”

allocate”

someone “changes ofﬁce space” renders one or

superﬂuous and redundant when the terms themselves have such

in ordinary usage.

District

Court next relied 0n the idea that the legislative “practice” since

without additional action by the
its

by

and “control” as synonymous merely so

1998 With regard t0 I.C.§ 67-1602(3) has been for the presiding ofﬁcers t0 allocate

support

“control,”

“practical sense” t0 construe legislative intent

the Legislature does not have to act every time

different

Merriam—Webster deﬁnes “use,” when

are so different in this context.

full

Inc.

0n a

rule of statutory construction

T0

from State

v.

130 Idaho 727, 733—34, 947 P.2d 400, 406—07 (1997), t0

the effect that “[a] basic rule 0f statutory construction

t0 construction, especially

space

Legislature t0 determine the use. R., pp. 459—60.

point, the District Court relied

Hagerman Water Right Owners,

all

where the public

relies

on

is

that the application

of a statute

that application over a long period

is

an aid

of

time.” R., p. 459.

That rule 0f construction the District Court relied on
the Legislature has in fact acted

ﬁrst

ﬂoor of the Capitol

all

Treasurer t0 keep State

two separate occasions

2007, the Legislature amended LC.

State

moneys

moneys

in a

upon completion 0f the renovation
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0f the

to include the Treasurer’s ofﬁce.

On May 2,
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in the vault

and safe

§

67-1204, the statute requiring

in the Capitol building, t0 allow the

temporary location during renovation 0f the Capitol, and

the Legislature required that the Treasurer again keep State

moneys

in the vault

and safe 0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor 0f the Capitol building.

Session Laws, Chapter 41, §
Capitol, at least in part,

2.

would be used

for the Treasurer’s ofﬁce.

was

Where

p. 107.

remains t0 date. See, R.,
Subsequently on

2007 Idaho

In doing so, the Legislature determined that the ﬁrst

renovation, the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

it

R., p. 248;

in fact

May 22,

moved back to

its

ﬂoor 0f the

Upon completion 0f the

original quarters in the Capitol

2007, the Legislature acted to approve and fund the

renovation plan for the Capitol proposed by the Capitol Commission, Which speciﬁcally
included the ofﬁce 0f the Treasurer 0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor. That same legislation amended I.C. § 67-

1602 giving power

t0 the Legislature t0 determine the use

Laws, Chapter 157, §§

The
The

1

use.”

It is

it

2.

District Court’s past practices point is

District

the Legislature focusing

460. But again

and

of the ﬁrst ﬂoor. 2007 Idaho Session

simply not applicable in

this case.

Court next focused on public policy, noting that public policy favors

0n issues “other than the allocation 0f speciﬁc ofﬁce space

...” R., p.

conﬂates the meaning of “allocation” with the meaning of “determine the

not suggested that the Legislature has to act every time someone changes ofﬁces.
Just as the District Court ignored the rules of statutory construction regarding in

pari materia related prior legislation being

known t0

the Legislature,

it

also ignored,

or discounted several key facts which are plainly in the record in reaching

conclusion on statutory construction in the event the Statute

is

its

minimized

ultimate

ambiguous.

For example, the District Court completely ignored the passage of I.C.
1204, which expressly stated the Treasurer’s ofﬁce
the Renovation, shortly before the Legislature

record. See, R., pp. 231, 248; Aug., p. 3;
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would

return t0

amended LC.

§

its

§

67-

place in the Capitol after

67-1602. This was plainly in the

2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 41,

§ 2.

The

District

Court likewise discounted the plain fact that the Governor and the

Legislature negotiated and reached an agreement

which included the documented Agreement
since the Capitol

was

0n a course of action

to leave the Treasurer’s

for the Renovation,

ofﬁce Where

it

has been

originally built, until the Treasurer decides t0 leave, evidence 0f Which

is

abundant in the record. R., pp. 83—84, 86—88,109—35, 257—58, 263—66, 270—71,337—38.
Finally, the District Court also ignored the signiﬁcance

0f the Legislature’s

adoption of the Capital Commission’s Plan as an aid t0 construction, only considering, and

minimizing, the Capitol Commission’s meeting notes. R.,

enactment of the

amended

bill that

§

LC. 67-1602

in 2007,

funded the Capital Commission’s Renovation Plan, Which

was 0n

the ﬁrst

p.

it

461. In the Legislature’s
also expressly approved

left

the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

ﬂoor 0f the Capitol. 2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 157, §§

In short, the aids t0 construction the District Court relied

0n

t0

1

and

where

and

it

2.

conclude that

Respondents’ interpretation was preferred are incomplete, incorrect and unpersuasive, and
provide no support for her decision on

summary judgment.

In the alternative, t0 date the Legislature has twice determined the use 0f

C.

the ﬁrst ﬂoor of the Capitol to include the Treasurer’s ofﬁce.

On May 2,
the Treasurer to keep

all

Treasurer t0 keep State

2007, the Legislature amended I.C.

State

moneys

moneys

in a

in the vault

and safe

§

67-1204, the statute requiring

in the Capitol building, t0 allow the

temporary location during renovation of the Capitol, and

upon completion 0f the renovation

the Legislature required that the Treasurer return to the ﬁrst

ﬂoor and again keep State moneys

in the vault

R., p. 248;

and safe 0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor 0f the Capitol building.

2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 41,

that the ﬁrst

ﬂoor of the Capitol,
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at least in part,

§ 2. In

doing

would be used

s0, the Legislature

determined

for the Treasurer’s ofﬁce.

Upon

completion 0f the renovation, the Treasurer’s ofﬁce did in fact
quarters in the Capitol

Where

On May 22,
for the Capitol

it

remains today. R.,

move back t0

its

original

p. 107.

2007, the Legislature acted t0 approve and fund the renovation plan

proposed by the Capitol Commission, which speciﬁcally included the ofﬁce the

Treasurer 0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor. That same legislation

amended LC.

§

67-1602 giving power to the

Legislature t0 determine the use of the ﬁrst ﬂoor. 2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 157, §§

and

1

2.

Ten years now

since the Treasurer retook occupancy of the renovated ofﬁces

0n

the Capitol’s ﬁrst ﬂoor, legislative leadership seeks t0 dislodge the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature has taken n0 action to determine a use for the ﬁrst

ﬂoor other than by
the Capitol

fund a

its

action

amending

Commission’s renovation

move

I.C. §

plan.

67-1204 and by passage 0f H.B. 218 approving

The 2019 Legislature made four

efforts t0

move

t0

for the Treasurer’s ofﬁce, all 0f which failed. R., pp. 94—95, 97—105.

The 2019

Legislature’s

amendment of § 67-1204 did n0 more than save

the

Treasurer from a felony charge should she choose to keep the State’s monies in a secure place
other than the vault and safe in her ofﬁce.

The

D.
delegate

District Court’s decisions impermissiblv interpreted

all legislative

From

its

Statute t0 delegate all

power

C. 67-1602 t0

t0 the presiding ofﬁcers in violation of Idaho’s Constitution.

earliest consideration

power t0

I.

0f this case, the District Court interpreted the

act t0 the presiding ofﬁcers. In

its

decision 0n the Motion t0

Dismiss, the District Court said:

The

statute outlines a clear delegation

allocate “all

of the power belonging to the Legislature t0

space” listed in the statute to the Plaintiffs in their ofﬁcial capacities. The

does not provide any additional procedure for the Legislature as a whole t0
undertake before the presiding ofﬁcers can make the allocation, and does not need t0 d0
statute
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so.

Whether such a scheme

is

workable or good policy

is

not an appropriate

consideration for this court.

Having found

that the plain language

0f I.C.

§

67-1602(3) clearly delegates the power

to allocate the space at issue to the Plaintiffs acting in their ofﬁcial capacities, the

Will

now

Court

analyze the various arguments asserted in the Motion to Dismiss. (emphasis

added).

R., pp.

1

53—54.

The

District

Court continued

this interpretation in its decision

on the cross

Motions for Summary Judgement:

The

statute then delegates the power t0 exercise such control exclusively t0 the presiding
ofﬁcers by stating, “All space Within the ﬁrst, third and fourth ﬂoors and the basement
shall be allocated by the presiding ofﬁcers 0f the senate and house 0f representatives.”

Id.

The Legislature expressly delegated
the space under

.

its

control t0

its

all

of its power to allocate

who

actually

is

assigned

presiding ofﬁcers (emphasis added).

456—57.

Every
Olsen

v.

J.A.

effort

Freeman

C0.,

should be

made

t0 interpret a statute constitutional.

See

117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990) (Any doubt

concerning interpretation 0f a statute

is

t0

be resolved in favor of that which

Will render the statute constitutional.); State

v.

Rawson, 100 Idaho 308, 31

1,

597 P.2d

31, 34 (1979).

“The

legislative

power of the

state shall

0f representatives.” Idaho Constitution, Article
In

March of this

3, § 1.

year, this Court noted:

In determining Whether a statute
this

be vested in a senate and house

an unconstitutional delegation 0f legislative power,
Court has examined whether the statute imposes guidelines on the decision-making
is

body, or grants “unbridled” authoritv t0 that body. Yick Kong Corp, 94 Idaho at 885,
499 P.2d at 584; Kemer, 99 Idaho at 450—51, 583 P.2d at 377—78; Greater Boise

Royal Inn ofBoise, 106 Idaho 884, 886, 684 P.2d 286, 288 (1984).
Thus, the crux 0f the analysis is an examination 0f Whether the statute lacks “standards,

Auditorium

Dist.
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guidelines, restrictions or qualiﬁcations 0f any sort placed in the delegating legislation.”

See Royal Inn ofBoise, 106 Idaho at 886, 684 P.2d at 288. Such a lack of legislative
guidance violates the Idaho Constitution’s separation 0f powers doctrine as an unbridled
delegation of lawmaking power, while the presence 0f such guidelines and restrictions
creates a proper “fact-ﬁnding” status to ascertain the facts

and conditions upon which
the law becomes operative. See id.; Kemer, 99 Idaho at 450—51, 583 P.2d at 377—78.
When conducting this analysis, the Court must also consider the “practical context of the
problem to be remedied and the policy t0 be served.” Kemer, 99 Idaho at 450—51, 583
P.2d at 377—78 (emphasis added).

Employers Resource Management C0.

Kealey, 166 Idaho 449,

v.

,

461 P.3d 731, 736

(2020).

The

District Court’s interpretation

0f the Statute here certainly “granted

‘unbridled’ authority” t0 the presiding ofﬁcers without any “guidelines.” In effect
interpretation rendered the Statute an unconstitutional delegation 0f legislative

That improper interpretation 0f the Statute should not be approved by
E.

The

District

The

1.

The

Court erred

in

Court denied

all

power to them.

this Court.

denving Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss.

District Court’s decision

District

its

on the Motion

aspects of Appellant’s

t0 Dismiss.

Motion

to Dismiss, including

Appellant’s arguments that the Respondents’ lacked standing t0 bring this action and that the
case involved a political question that should not be addressed

On the

the courts.

standing issue, the District Court held:

In this case, the Plaintiffs are not merely

some hypothetical

two individual

legislators seeking t0

or dispersed right of the Legislature as a whole.

clear delegation 0f power to the Plaintiffs,

space at issue

by

may belong t0

t0 allocate the space

Which they sought

The

remedy

statute provides a

t0 exercise.

The use 0f the

the legislative department as a whole, but the decision of how

belongs to the

Plaintiffs.

Based on the foregoing,

this

Court finds that

they have standing t0 ﬁle suit for a declaration 0f rights under the statute. Therefore, the

motion

t0 dismiss

based on lack 0f standing

R., pp. 156—57.
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is

denied. (emphasis added).

On the political
asserted

by

question doctrine, the District Court found that the claim

the complaint did not pose a political question because passing

constitutionality of statutory enactments

1

is

on the

a fundamental responsibility of the judiciary. R., pp.

64—65.

The

2.

Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion t0 Dismiss With

District

respect to the political question doctrine.

In Idaho, the core of the political question doctrine

entertaining review 0f a particular matter,

coordinate branch of government,

branch.”

Miles

v.

Troutner

v.

would be

when the

substituting

“whether the Court, by

is

its

judgment

for that 0f another

matter was one properly entrusted to that other

Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006)(quoting,

Idaho Power C0., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989)). In Miles,

noted that the argument
system, which

is

is

this

Court

akin to the political question abstention doctrine of the federal court

outlined in Baker

v.

Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761.

The

federal courts articulate the Doctrine

“involves a political question

commitment of the

Where there

is ‘a

somewhat

differently as a controversy

textually demonstrable constitutional

issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially

discoverable and manageable standards for resolving

228, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d

1

it.’

“

(1993) (quoting, Baker

Nixon
v.

v.

United States, 506 U.S. 224,

Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct.

691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)).

However, Miles

states that the issue is

0f separation 0f powers in Idaho, Which
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is

more

correctly

Viewed under the doctrine

speciﬁcally embraced in Article 2, §

1

0f the Idaho

Constitution. Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. Article 2, 0f the Idaho Constitution

provides:

SECTION

1.

DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT.

The powers of the government of

divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and
and no person or collection 0f persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging t0 one 0f these departments shall exercise any powers properly
belonging to either 0f the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed 0r
this state are

judicial;

permitted.

Idaho Constitution, Article 2

§ 1.

The Troutner and Miles cases
doctrine.

are perhaps the leading cases in Idaho

The Troutner case involved a challenge

0n the

Governor’s appointment of Phil

t0 the

Reberger t0 the Judicial Council, and the Senate’s conﬁrmation 0f his appointment. Troutner,
142 Idaho
Id. at

at

391, 128 P.3d at 928.

392, 128 P.3d at 929.

§ 1—2101(1),

They

The

plaintiffs

(3)

0f the appointed members be from one

and Reberger would be a fourth Republican.

The Court noted

that Article 4, § 6

Id. at

0f the Idaho Constitution provides, “The

ofﬁces are established by this constitution, 0r which
is

not otherwise provided

(1)

391, 128 P.3d at 928.

governor shall nominate and, by and with the consent of the senate, appoint

appointment 0r election

Party.

asserted Reberger’s appointment to the Council violated I.C.

Which required n0 more than three

political party,

were members of the Idaho Democratic

may be

for.

Id. at

created

all

ofﬁcers Whose

by law, and whose

393, 128 P.3d at 930.

The framers

understood that gubernatorial appointments are part of the political process, and provided
Senate conﬁrmation as the check 0n the Governor’s absolute grant of appointive authority.

at

Id.

393, 128 P.3d at 930.

Accordingly, the Court held that

guaranteed by Article

II,

§ 1,

-
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would

Violate the separation 0f powers

0f the Idaho Constitution t0 substitute the Court’s View for that of

the Senate regarding whether Reberger
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it

was qualiﬁed

t0

be appointed t0 the Council.

Id.

The Miles case involved a claim brought by a rate payer
the

Swan

Falls

116 Idaho

at

Agreement and associated enabling

636—7, 778 P.2d

at

constitutionality

Swan Falls Agreement

of statutory enactments, even enactments with

However, the Court did
itself is

Id. at

639—40, 778 P.2d

not a proper subj ect for judicial deliberation and

Governor and the Legislature both have

the Legislature through the passage of bills

the Court held

761—2.

0f the Swan Falls
it

would be inappropriate
Id.

framework demonstrates

roles to play regarding the enactment

by

the Senate and

Governor through the veto power. Idaho Constitution,

by these

at

Swan Falls Agreement.

In the context 0f this case, Idaho’s constitutional

exclusively vested

itself,

political overtones, is a

state that that the advisability

for the Court t0 second-guess the merits 0f the

the

Legislature. Miles,

of powers/political question doctrine was inapplicable because passing on the

fundamental responsibility 0f the judiciary.

Agreement

by the

of

758—9. Noting that the dispute was more about the

constitutionality of the enabling statutes than the

that the separation

statutes enacted

t0 challenge the terms

that

0f legislation,

House 0f Representatives, and

Art. 3 §

1,

Art.

4

§ 10.

the

These powers are

separate constitutional provisions in the Legislature and the

Governor respectively.

A necessary part 0f these constitutionally vested powers is the inherent ability of
the

and

Governor and the Legislature
its effect.

t0 negotiate

and perhaps agree With each other on legislation

Here, the Legislature and the Governor reached a comprehensive agreement

regarding the Renovation of the Capitol which included a documented Agreement t0 leave the
Treasurer’s ofﬁce where

it

has been since the Capitol was originally

Treasurer might choose t0 leave. This agreement
this Court. R., pp.

is

built, until

amply demonstrated

in the record before

83—84, 86—88,109—35, 257—58, 263—66, 270—71,337—38.
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such time as a

This case

Agreement

in the

the Troutner case and the treatment of the

is like

Swan Falls

Accordingly, this Court should not disturb this agreement

Miles case.

reached between the Governor and the Legislature by deciding

this case,

because the case

involves a political question, and doing so would Violate the separation 0f powers between the
three branches 0f government.

3.

The

action should therefore have been dismissed.

The Respondents do not have standing

The

District

Court based

t0 the Plaintiffs.” R., p. 156.

As

its

standing decision 0n the “clear delegation 0f power

discussed in Section

interpretation 0f the Statute With respect t0 delegation

standing

is

D above, the District Court’s
was improper. Therefore,

its

decision on

incorrect as well.

When determining whether a party has
States

to bring this action.

Supreme Court decisions

P.3d 372, 375 (2008). In Rains

for guidance.

v.

Koch

v.

standing, this Court has looked t0 United

Canyon Cnlyu 145 Idaho

158, 161 177

Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), the United States Supreme Court

addressed the concept 0f legislative standing and held that four individual members of Congress
did not have standing to challenge the passage 0f the Line Item Veto Act because individual

members 0f Congress did not have a sufﬁcient “personal

stake” in the dispute and had not

alleged a sufﬁciently concrete injury t0 establish standing. Rains, 521 U.S. 830.

The

who d0

situation here

is

n0

different here.

Respondents are individual

legislators

not have a sufﬁcient “personal stake” 0r a sufﬁciently concrete injury t0 establish

standing, absent an act 0f the Legislature as a

Whole authorizing

this action.

Appellant’s claim should be dismissed for lack of standing.
F.

The Treasurer’s ofﬁce
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is

entitled t0 its costs

0n appeal.

Accordingly,

As
its

the prevailing party

0n appeal, the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

costs as a matter 0f course, in accordance With Idaho Appellate

is

entitled t0

an award 0f

Rule 40.

CONCLUSION
The plain meaning of I.C.
even

if

it

were determined

to

67-1602(3)

§

is

unambiguous and

strikingly clear; but

be ambiguous, the Legislative Department has the sole authority

to

determine the use 0f the space 0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor 0f the Capitol. Once the use of that space has

been determined, the

legislative leadership

may

allocate the space, not before.

The

District

Court mistakenly conﬂated the functions 0f the Legislative Department t0 determine the use 0f

and

that space,

that

0f legislative leadership t0 allocate the space. The functions are not the

same. The Legislature must act t0 determine the use of the space before legislative leadership

can allocate the space.

We have agreed in the alternative that the Legislature has acted t0 determine the
use of the space by amending I.C.

§

67-1204 and by adopting the Capitol Commissions’ plan

for renovation.

In either event, the District Court’s Order granting legislative leadership’s

Motion

for

Summary Judgment should be

Motion by ordering
allocated;

and

that the Legislature

in the event the

of the space, then, should

it

reversed and the Court should grant the Treasurer’s

must determine the use 0f the space

at issue

before

Court decides that the Legislature has acted t0 determine the use

choose,

it

must

act again to determine the use if the ﬁrst

ﬂoor space

does not include the Treasurer.
In the event the Court should vacate the District Court’s Order denying the

Treasurer’s Motion to Dismiss, the case before the Court must be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day 0f November, 2020.
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